Introduced default security settings with stricter access control, including policies requiring owner/admin privileges by default. Added multiple pre-configured policy recipes, custom validator support, and extended documentation for security, configurations, and use cases.
Deleted `subscription_stability_test.go` to clean up unused or redundant code. Updated naming in test files for improved readability, replacing `tag` with `tg` for consistency. Also updated the `github.com/klauspost/compress` dependency to v1.18.2.
Introduce tests to validate functionality for new policy fields, including `max_expiry_duration`, `protected_required`, `identifier_regex`, and `follows_whitelist_admins`. Also, cover combinations of new and existing fields to ensure compatibility and precedence rules are correctly enforced.
bump to v0.31.2
- Increase WebSocket message size limit from 500KB to 10MB to prevent
truncation of large kind 3 follow list events (8000+ follows)
- Add validation in SaveEvent to reject kind 3 events without p tags
before storage, preventing malformed events from buggy relays
- Implement CleanupKind3WithoutPTags() to remove existing malformed
kind 3 events at startup
- Add enhanced logging showing tag count and event ID when rejecting
invalid kind 3 events for better observability
- Create round-trip test proving binary tag encoding preserves p tags
correctly through JSON→binary→JSON cycle
- Root cause: 500KB limit was truncating large follow lists during
WebSocket receive, causing tags to be lost or incomplete
- Three-layer defense: prevent at gate (size), validate (save time),
and cleanup (startup)
Files modified:
- app/handle-websocket.go: Increase DefaultMaxMessageSize to 10MB
- pkg/database/save-event.go: Add kind 3 validation with logging
- pkg/database/cleanup-kind3.go: New cleanup function
- pkg/database/cleanup-kind3_test.go: Round-trip test
- app/main.go: Invoke cleanup at startup
- Update nostr library to v1.0.3 with improved binary tag support
- Replace tag.Value() calls with tag.ValueHex() to handle both binary and hex formats
- Add NormalizeTagValueForHash() for consistent filter tag normalization
- Update QueryPTagGraph to handle binary-encoded and hex-encoded pubkeys
- Fix tag matching in query-events.go using TagValuesMatchUsingTagMethods
- Add filter_utils.go with tag normalization helper functions
- Update delete operations in process-delete.go and neo4j/delete.go
- Fix ACL follows extraction to use ValueHex() for consistent decoding
- Add binary_tag_filter_test.go for testing tag value normalization
- Bump version to v0.30.3
- Add 'serve' subcommand for ephemeral RAM-based relay at /dev/shm with
open ACL mode for testing and benchmarking
- Fix e-tag and p-tag decoding to use ValueHex()/ValueBinary() methods
instead of Value() which returns raw bytes for binary-optimized storage
- Document all command-line tools in readme.adoc (relay-tester, benchmark,
stresstest, blossomtest, aggregator, convert, FIND, policytest, etc.)
- Switch Docker images from Alpine to Debian for proper libsecp256k1
Schnorr signature and ECDH support required by Nostr
- Upgrade Docker Go version from 1.21 to 1.25
- Add ramdisk mode (--ramdisk) to benchmark script for eliminating disk
I/O bottlenecks in performance measurements
- Add docker-compose.ramdisk.yml for tmpfs-based benchmark volumes
- Add test coverage for privileged policy with binary-encoded p-tags
- Fix blossom test to expect 200 OK for anonymous uploads when auth is
not required (RequireAuth=false with ACL mode 'none')
- Update follows ACL to handle both binary and hex p-tag formats
- Grant owner access to all users in serve mode via None ACL
- Add benchmark reports from multi-relay comparison run
- Update CLAUDE.md with binary tag handling documentation
- Bump version to v0.30.2
Policy System Verification & Testing (Latest Updates) Authentication & Security:
Verified policy system enforces authentication for all REQ and EVENT messages when enabled
Confirmed AUTH challenges are sent immediately on connection and repeated until authentication succeeds
Validated unauthenticated requests are silently rejected regardless of other policy rules
Access Control Logic:
Confirmed privileged flag only restricts read access (REQ queries), not write operations (EVENT submissions)
Validated read_allow and privileged use OR logic: users get access if EITHER they're in the allow list OR they're a party to the event (author/p-tag)
This design allows both explicit whitelisting and privacy for involved parties
Kind Whitelisting:
Verified kind filtering properly rejects unlisted events in all scenarios:
Explicit kind.whitelist: Only listed kinds accepted, even if rules exist for other kinds
Implicit whitelist (rules only): Only kinds with defined rules accepted
Blacklist mode: Blacklisted kinds rejected, others require rules
Added comprehensive test suite (10 scenarios) covering edge cases and real-world configurations
mleku